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Abstract
This paper studies the correlation between inequality, measured by the Gini coefﬁcent of
incomes, and the growth rate of per capita GDP in a panel of countries between the late 1950s
and late 1990s. Inequality Granger causes growth with a negative coefﬁcient, while growth
Granger causes inequality with a positive sign. Quantitatively, the former effect appears much
larger than the latter. Once I allow for the effect to differ between rich and poor countries
interesting differences emerge. While lagged inequality appears positively correlated with
growth in the subgroup of rich countries, in poor countries besides a negative and signiﬁcant
effect of lagged inequality on growth there is a negative and signiﬁcant effect of lagged growth
on inequality.
JEL classification: O11, O40, D3, C23.
Keywords: growth, inequality, panel, GMM, Granger causality.
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The relationship between inequality and economic growth has long been debated in
the literature. Arguments that yield a positive and a negative relationship have both been
offered. Bénabou (1996) and Aghion et al. (1999) provide excellent surveys of the various
contributions. On the one hand, inequality would provide more incentives to accumulate
both physical and human capital and therefore foster growth. This could be because the
rich save more than the poor, or because large sunk costs entail investment indivisibilities or
because lower distortionary taxation (usually associated with more inequality) raises returns to
saving. On the other hand, inequality may reduce investment opportunities, worsen borrowers’
incentivesandgeneratemacroeconomicinstability: all of thesechannels woulddirectlyreduce
economic growth. The idea is that when agents are heterogeneous and capital markets
are imperfect, greater inequality may be bad for growth because it would limit productive
investments in physical and human capital.
Underlying the above arguments there is the assumption of causality running from
inequality to growth. Yet, the sign of the effect of higher growth on inequality seems equally
theoretically ambiguous. Recent discussion has focused on ﬁnding an explanation for changes
in earnings dispersion (see Atkinson, 1997, for a survey). Since earnings are a substantial
share of overall income this has obvious implications for overall income inequality. Trade
openness or technical change — or a combination of the two — might have enhanced growth,
beneﬁting, via ademand shift, skilled versus unskilled labor and thereby exacerbating earnings
dispersion. In fact, the effect of both the increased liberalization of international trade and
faster technical change on inequality is theoretically unclear, since it may depend on the extent
of the reallocation of resources induced by trade reforms or on the nature of the technical
progress. Further, other growth-enhancing policies may also have an inﬂuence on inequality,
which is a priori ambiguous. A non-exhaustive list includes public spending, policies to curb
inﬂation and credit market reforms. The absence of a clear conclusion from the theoretical
standpoint calls for compelling empirical evidence.
1 This study was ﬁrst undertaken while I was visiting the Department of Economics of the University of
California at Berkeley, which I thank for hospitality. I also thank seminar participants at the Bank of Italy and
two anonymous referees. I particularly beneﬁted from discussions with Andrea Brandolini. All errors are mine.
The opinion expressed in this paper are the author’s and cannot be attributed to the Bank of Italy. E-mail:
patrizio.pagano@bancaditalia.it8
With respect to the effect of inequality on growth, recent studies have reached opposite
conclusions, possibly due to the estimation method adopted. In general, as suggested by
Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003), it seems that studies that emphasize the cross-sectional variability
ofinequality dataﬁndanegativecorrelationbetweenlagged inequality andsubsequent growth,
while studies that emphasize the time-series variability ﬁnd the opposite result. For instance,
Perotti (1993, 1996), Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) ﬁnd, in a
cross-section of countries, that greater initial inequality reduces the subsequent average rate of
growth, where the average is taken over a possibly very long time span. In the same venue,
Barro (2002) using a panel of countries over ten-year averages reaches the same conclusion
with random country effects, which again exploit the cross-sectional variability of the data. On
the other hand, these results have been challenged by Li and Zu (1998) and by Forbes (2000),
who in a panel of countries with ﬁve-year averages and country ﬁxed effect — and therefore
emphasizingthe time seriesvariabilityof the data—ﬁnd apositivecorrelation between lagged
Gini coefﬁcient and subsequent per capita income growth.
Empirical analysis is also not conclusive with respect to the effect of higher growth on
inequality. For instance, Berman et al. (1994), using US data, ﬁnd that faster skill-biased
technical change, and therefore higher growth, delivers an increase in inequality. On the
contrary, Dollar and Kraay (2002), using cross-country data, show that growth delivers the
same beneﬁts to the lowest quintile of the distribution of incomes as to the average individual
and, therefore, that it does not increase inequality, measured as the ratio of the two quintiles.
In the only paper, to my knowledge, that treats the evolution of growth and inequality as
the outcome of similar processes and estimates a reduced-form model, Lundberg and Squire
(2003)claimthatwhilesomepolicyvariablesinvolveatrade-offbetweenmoregrowthandless
inequality, expanded schooling and more equitable distribution of land will decrease income
inequality and may also enhance growth.
As highlighted by Forbes (2000), all of these studies have to tackle two relevant
econometric problems: measurement error in inequality and omitted-variable bias.
Measurement error is always a concern in cross-country studies and inequality is one of the
variables most severely subject to it. Countries have different deﬁnitions of it and varying
degrees of accuracy in data collection. Furthermore, few of them have compiled data on
income distribution on a regular basis and sometimes the data collected is unreliable, coverage9
is uneven, and there is a lack of consistency in the deﬁnition of income and the unit of
account. In general, since no good instrument for inequality exists, it is difﬁcult to correct for
these problems. The point is that, on one hand, random measurement error could generate an
attenuation bias and reduce the signiﬁcance of results. On the other hand, however, systematic
measurement error could lead to either a positive or negative bias, depending on the correlation
between the measurement error and the other variables in the regression. This suggests the
importance of including country ﬁxed effects.
Another source of concern in a cross-country regression could be omitted-variable bias,
although one cannot predict its direction in a multivariate context. This is especially true in
a growth regression framework, where given the numerous variables that have been proved to
be correlated with growth, it is difﬁcult to predict ap r i o r ihow omitted variables could affect
estimates of the relationship between inequality and growth. Again, one method of reducing
omitted-variable bias is to use a panel technique which, by including ﬁxed effects, at least gets
rid of the bias caused by the omission of time-non-varying explanatory variables.
This paper tries to examine the complex dynamic relationship between inequality and
growth using the statistical concept of Granger causality, where one variable is regressed on
lagged values of the other variable as well as on its own lags. Therefore, unlike most of the
previous literature, it looks explicitly to the two-way relationship between these variables. The
aim is to extract some empirical regularities, which would help researchers in building models.
In order to deal with the aforementioned problems of measurement error and omitted-
variable bias I concentrate on a ﬁxed-effect model. But contrary to all empirical literature,
which, under a similar approach, takes 5 or 10-year averages of Gini coefﬁcients in order
to obtain a panel that is more balanced and less subject to business-cycle ﬂuctuations, I
explicitly use all the time-series variation of the data. As suggested by Attanasio et al. (2000),
annual data provide information that is lost when averaging, especially in periods of rapid
evolution of the variables of interest. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that averaging over
ﬁxed interval would help in identifying long-run relationships, since the length of interval over
which averages are computed is arbitrary, while business cycles may vary across countries
and over time. By emphasizing the time series feature of the data I am forced to work with a
limited sample of countries, but the results proved robust to various sensitivity experiments.10
The estimation method employed is a Generalized Method of Moments technique
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It is well suited to control for any measurement error
and for any time-invariant omitted variables. Results should be used to assess the correlation
between inequality and growth within country. They suggest that an increase in a country’s
level of income inequality has a negative effect on subsequent economic growth. On the
other hand, an increase in a country’s economic growth is associated with higher subsequent
income inequality. Quantitatively, the former effect appears much larger than the latter. The
negative relationship between inequality and subsequent growth contrasts with the results of
other papers that adopt a similar approach (e.g. Li and Zou, 1998, or Forbes, 2000) and
suggests, at least, caution in taking time-averages of the data. Interesting differences emerge
when I allow for the Granger-causing variable to differ between rich and poor countries. In
particular, in the latter, besides a negative effect of lagged inequality on subsequent growth I
also ﬁnd a negative effect of lagged growth on subsequent inequality. On the other hand, in
rich countries inequality appears positively associated with growth.
In the rest of the paper I ﬁrst introduce the empirical strategy (section 2). Then, in
section 3 I discuss the characteristics of the dataset and the adjustment necessary to make the
Gini coefﬁcients of income comparable across countries and years. In section 4 I will examine
formally the correlation between inequality and growth, also performing several sensitivity
experiments and allowing for differences between rich and poor countries. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2. Model



























j + ηjt. (2)
The coefﬁcients γ
g
l are relevant for Granger causality running from inequality to growth,
while the coefﬁcients γi
l are relevant for Granger causality running in the opposite direction.11
I assume that the residuals of the two equations of the system (εjt,ηjt) are uncorrelated with
the variables on the right-hand side and are i.i.d.
Note that in both equations (1) and (2), lagged dependent variables are functions of the




ﬁxed-effect estimator is biased and inconsistent. Moreover, in principle, the variable different
from the lagged dependent may not be considered strongly exogenous.
An interesting estimation technique would be to consider coefﬁcients varying across
countries and then focus on ‘mean group’ estimates of the parameters of interest (Pesaran
and Smith, 1995). Unfortunately this option is not practicable with these datasets, given the
absence of sufﬁciently long time series for most of the countries in the sample.
Therefore, to eliminate the bias and estimate this dynamic regression model I rely on the
GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) that estimates the equations in ﬁrst
differences. In fact, due to the differentiation, country-speciﬁc effects νj have been eliminated.
However, as ﬁrst-differencing induces MA(1) residuals, instrumental variable techniques are
called for. In these equations, if there is no serial correlation in the time-varying component
of the error term, endogenous variables lagged two or more periods are valid instruments.
The absence of serial correlation is tested by examining the ﬁrst-differenced residuals: if the
disturbances are not serially correlated, there should be (evidence of signiﬁcant negative ﬁrst-
order serial correlation and) no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals.2 Like Attanasio et al. (2000) in their study on the relationship between savings and
growth, rather than investigate the optimal lag speciﬁcation, and given the data constraints, I
decided to use in each equation a ﬁxed number of lags of both the dependent and the other
RHS variable; that is, I assume K = J = M = N =2 . The set of instruments used in
each of the regressions presented below is reported in the notes to the corresponding table and
the validity of instruments has been checked via a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.3
As standard in the literature, in the tables I present one-step estimates, since the asymptotic
2 The test statistics are based on the standardized average residual autocovariances and are asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
3 TheSargantestisdistributedasaχ2 withdegreesoffreedomequaltothe numberofinstrumentalvariables
minus the number of parameters.12
standard errors for the two-step estimators can be unreliable in ﬁnite samples (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). Standard errors and test statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity.
In the tables I report a summary of the main results.4 In particular, I present the
sum of the coefﬁcients on the lagged Gini in the regression for growth — and of lagged
growth in the regression for Gini — as well as the p-value of the tests that such a sum is








x = g,irespectively in the inequality-to-growth and in the growth-to-inequality equations and
the p-value of a Granger-causality test, corresponding to the test of the hypothesis that all the
γx
l ’s are zero. The difference between the sum of the lagged coefﬁcients and the long-run
coefﬁcients implicitly indicates the persistence of the dependent variable.
3. Data set
As mentioned in the Introduction, for the data on inequality I use the Dollar and Kraay
(2002, henceforth DK) dataset.5 It contains more than 900 observations for Gini coefﬁcients
covering 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Almost 75 per cent of these data are from
the UN-WIDER WorldIncomeInequalityDatabase. Theothersare fromDeiningerandSquire
(1996), Chen and Ravallion (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2003).
Theinequalitydataset is ahighlyunbalancedpanelofobservations. Onlyafewcountries
have continuous time series of annual observations on income distribution. For the others,
information is much more dispersed.
For the income data I use the latest release of the Penn World Tables (mark 6.1, Heston
et al., 2002).
This gives me two samples:
A. all countries with at least two consecutive annual observations of lagged Gini coefﬁcients
and three consecutive annual observations for per capita GDP growth (forty countries
with an average of 7.25 observations per country; ‘growth dataset’); the estimation period
is 1958-1999.
4 A complete set of results is available upon request.
5 Downloaded from the World Bank website on April 25, 2003.13
B. all countries with at least three consecutive annual observations of Gini coefﬁcients
and two consecutive annual observations for lagged per capita GDP growth (thirty-one
countries with an average of 7.77 observations per country; ‘inequality dataset’); the
estimation period is 1958-1998.
The resulting samples of countries included in the analysis are clearly not representative,
yet — as will be clearer below — they are balanced overall in terms of coverage of rich and
poor countries, both as regards the number of observations and of countries. Details on the
countries included in each set of regressions are in Table 12.
3.1 Data adjustment
Since they are described at length in DK, I will not spend much space in discussing
the various characteristics of the dataset, except for the following point. A critical problem
of inequality data is that this collection of Gini coefﬁcients comes from national surveys that
are highly heterogeneous in terms of coverage, welfare criterion (gross income, net income or
consumption) and unit of observation (individuals or households). The DK dataset is limited
to inequality measures based on nationally representative surveys. To obtain comparable
inequality measures I adjust the Gini ﬁgures as in DK, with a notable difference. Since I use
all available data, I run the ‘adjustment’ regression using the whole annual dataset: I regress
the Gini coefﬁcient on a set of regional dummies, dummies indicating whether the welfare
measure is gross income or consumption, and a set of year dummies. Unfortunately, since for
most of the data it is not possible to control for the unit of observation, I follow DK and ignore
this difference. The results are reported in Table 1. As expected, they are very similar to those
reported in DK. All the variables included are highly signiﬁcant. Gini coefﬁcients measured in
terms of consumption are on average smaller, while those measured in terms of gross income
are larger. The ‘adjusted’ Gini coefﬁcient is then obtained by subtracting, where necessary,
the coefﬁcient of the dummy consumption or of the dummy gross income from the unadjusted
Gini.
Despite this adjustment procedure, I am aware that this dataset has the same problems
of secondary datasets raised by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). However, ﬁrst of all
one can argue that the strong requirement for at least two or three consecutive annual
observations I impose favors only countries with potentially ‘good’ statistics. In fact, while
these requirements limit the number of countries covered in the analysis, they also keep14
in only countries that collect inequality statistics more continuously. Second, it is clear
that, despite these adjustments, substantial measurement error remains. But as long as the
measurement error is country-speciﬁc — as I think it is, given the above discussion about
country heterogeneity in surveys and the substantial stability in Gini coefﬁcients (see Li et
al., 1998) — in all the regressions that follow it will be captured by the country ﬁxed effect.
Finally, in the sensitivity analysis I run some regressions using only data on Gini primarily
referred to income — that is, making only net/gross adjustment and dropping data referred
to expenditures — and only to net income, that is, dropping all the observations referred to
expenditure or gross income. In both cases results remain extremely stable.
Before running the Granger-causality test embedded in equations (1) and (2), I ﬁrst
investigate the static relationship between the two variables of interest by analyzing the
contemporaneous correlation. Given the panel structure of the dataset, correlation coefﬁcients
can be computed in various ways. I ﬁrst consider the whole dataset of annual data and then
that on time-averaged data, which emphasizes the cross-sectional dispersion.
Notice that the growth rate is by far more variable than the Gini coefﬁcient. For instance,
in the growth dataset the coefﬁcient of variation of real per capita GDP growth is 1.51 against
0.23 for the Gini. Further, while the coefﬁcient of variation of Gini coefﬁcients is almost
unchanged (0.27) when going to time-averaged data, conﬁrming the substantial stability of
inequality across time, the coefﬁcient of variation of growth rates computed on time-averaged
data almost halves (0.81), but is still larger than the Gini. In the inequality dataset the pattern
is little changed.
In Table 3 I present both pairwise and rank correlation coefﬁcients in the two datasets I
selected above. The ﬁrst result is that all coefﬁcients are statistically not different from zero.
Moreover, point estimates are negative for coefﬁcients calculated on annual data, but they
become positive on time-averaged data. The latter result gives a ﬁrst snapshot of how things
can change when using the whole annual dataset or that of time-averaged data.
I now turn to a more formal investigation of the relationship between inequality and
growth, which takes explicit account of the possibility of dynamic correlation and controls for
the effect of omitted variables.15
4. Results
Table 4 reports the results of the basic speciﬁcation where per capita GDP growth is
regressed on two of its own lags and two lags of the Gini coefﬁcients. In column FE I present
the outcome of the standard ﬁxed-effect regression. I then tackle the bias arising from the
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the ﬁxed effect and use the Arellano and
Bond - GMM estimator of the ﬁrst-differenced model (column GMM 1). Next, I also allow
for the other RHS variable — that is Gini in the growth equation and growth in the inequality
equation — to be considered as endogenous and therefore to be instrumented (column GMM
2).
Let me ﬁrst examine the basic speciﬁcation of the inequality-to-growth regressions
(Table 4). As reported by other authors (Forbes, 2000) the FE estimator suggests a positive
point estimate of the coefﬁcient of lagged Gini, yet in this sample it is not statistically different
from zero. On the contrary, once the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable is properly
accounted for, it becomes negative. In fact, with the GMM estimator the Granger-causality test
indicates a strong signiﬁcance, both when Gini is considered exogenous (column GMM 1) and
whenitisconsideredpredetermined(columnGMM2). InlinewiththeresultsofEasterlyetal.
(1993) growth rates do not show much persistence and, correspondingly, the point estimates
of lagged inequality in the long run are very similar to those in the short run. The estimated
long-run effect of Gini on growth is higher in absolute value when it is also instrumented for
(column GMM 2). These results clash with those obtained by Forbes (2000) and, since the
speciﬁcation and the datasets are relatively similar, suggest caution in time-averaging the data.
Quantitatively, the coefﬁcients estimated in Table 4 are not small: one standard deviation
decrease in the Gini coefﬁcient (equal to 7.4 percentage points in this sample, see Table 2) is
associated with an increase in the long run of per capita income growth rate of 0.3 percentage
points if I use the estimate of column GMM 1 or of 0.7 percentage points if I use the estimate
of column GMM 2. Note that the average per capita growth rate in the sample is 2.8 per cent.
Turning now to the basic speciﬁcation of the growth-to-inequality regression (Table 5),
the FE estimator suggests a strong positive correlation between lagged growth and subsequent
inequality. The impact is particularly evident in the long run, suggesting a high persistence in
the Gini indices. Yet, as explained above, this result is affected by the correlation of the lagged
dependent variable with the ﬁxed effect. Once this is accounted for, the correlation between16
lagged growth and subsequent inequality remains positive, but the size of the coefﬁcient
becomes much smaller. Moreover, the similar magnitude of the sum of coefﬁcients of lagged
growth and the long run indicates that the high persistence in the Gini indices disappears.
According to point estimates, the long-run effect of growth on Gini is larger here when growth
also is considered endogenous (column GMM 2).
In this case, however, the estimated effects are quantitatively small. In fact, a 1 standard-
deviation increase in the growth rate (equal to 4.2 percentage points) delivers in the long run
an almost nil increase in the Gini coefﬁcient, between .04 and .07 points.
4.1 Robustness
To check the robustness of the above results I run several regressions. For simplicity,
and given that results are mainly unchanged in the two basic GMM speciﬁcations, I always
instrument only for the lagged dependent variable.
First of all I tackle directly some of the issues raised by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001)
about secondary datasets and concentrate on subsamples. In particular, since, as mentioned
above, the collection of Gini coefﬁcients includes some coefﬁcients calculated on gross
incomes and some on expenditures, I run the same basic regressions on a subset of the original
data. I either use only Gini coefﬁcients referred to incomes alone — therefore performing only
the gross/net adjustment discussed in section 3.1 and dropping those referred to consumption
— or Gini coefﬁcients referred only to net incomes — and thus dropping both those referred
to gross incomes and those referred to consumption. Of course, this reduces the number
of countries included in the analysis, respectively to 25 and 17 in the inequality-to-growth
regression and to 24 and 17 in the growth-to-inequality regressions. Results are reported in the
ﬁrst two columns of Tables 6 and 7. The main results are unchanged: inequality is negatively
related to subsequent growth and growth is positively related to subsequent inequality. In
both types of regressions the magnitude of coefﬁcients in signiﬁcantly higher when only data
on Gini coefﬁcients primarily referred to net income are included in the analysis. It may be
argued that this result is due to the fact that since there is less measurement error there is also
less attenuation bias.
The second type of sensitivity analysis I perform in this section is designed to check
whether the results are driven by any particular country series. I therefore ﬁrst exclude
those countries with a minimal number of observations, that is, countries that have only two17
consecutive annual observations for the Gini coefﬁcient in the inequality-to-growth regression
and countries that have only three consecutive annual observations for the Gini coefﬁcient
in the growth-to-inequality regression (columns labelled ‘obs>1’). Then I exclude, one at a
time, those countries with the largest number of observations. They comprise two developed
economies, the US and the UK, and two developing economies, Taiwan and India. Again, the
main message remains unchanged: inequality is negatively related to subsequent growth and
growth is positively related to subsequent inequality.
Finally, I also run regressions with the lag length set at 3. Since results are essentially
the same, even if the signiﬁcance of Granger-causality coefﬁcients is less evident, for brevity
I do not report them.
4.2 Controls
One of the advantages of assuming ﬁxed effects is that they account for any time-
non-varying omitted variables. Still, it is possible that the sign and/or the magnitude of the
correlation coefﬁcients reported above may be inﬂuenced by the omission of some important
explanatory variables. To account for this possibility, in this section I include as controls
the following variables, although the list is far from exhaustive. The controls are the degree
of openness, the price of investment, the logarithm of 1 plus the rate of inﬂation and the
government share of real per capita GDP.
Tradeopenness—measuredbythesumofexportsandimportsinconstantpricesdivided
by real per capita GDP — has been found to be good for growth (e.g. Frankel and Romer,
1999) and blamed for the widening of the distribution of incomes in some countries (e.g.
Wood, 1994). Since some authors (for instance Spilimbergo et al., 1999) have argued that it
may reﬂect the size of the country, I used the residuals of the regression of trade openness on
the logarithm of population and of the country area.
In each country, the price of investment measures how the cost of investment varies
between the country and the US. In the empirical growth literature this variable has been used
to capture market distortions that inﬂuence the cost of investment, such as tariffs, regulation,
corruption and the cost of foreign exchange.18
Inﬂation creates uncertainty and has been found to be bad for growth (Fischer, 1993).
Furthermore, as long as the poor are less able to hedge against inﬂation than the rich, higher
inﬂation could deliver more inequality.
Finally, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found that the higher government consumption the
lower GDP growth, since a high public share of GDP implies more taxes to balance the budget
and taxes are bad for growth.
All control variables are dated t and are treated as exogenous.6 I ﬁrst insert these control
variables one at a time and then all together. The main messages of the previous section
remain unchanged: inequality Granger-causes growth with a negative sign, while growth
Granger-causes inequality with a positive sign. In the inequality-to-growth regression (Table
8) trade openness is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with subsequent growth, but this
effect disappears when all controls are used together (column [5]). On the contrary, inﬂation
is negatively and robustly correlated with subsequent growth. Both market distortions and
the government share of GDP do not seem to have any signiﬁcant effect on growth. In all
cases lagged Gini appears still to Granger-cause growth with a negative coefﬁcient and the
magnitude of its coefﬁcients is quite unaffected.
In the growth-to-inequality regression, none of the control variables appears to be
signiﬁcantly correlated with subsequent inequality (Table 9). In all cases, growth Granger-
causes Gini with a positive coefﬁcient very similar to that obtained in the basic speciﬁcation.
Overall, these results conﬁrm the basic ﬁndings that inequality is negatively correlated
with subsequent growth and growth is positively correlated with subsequent inequality. Still,
as emphasized by Barro (2000) and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003), they might conceal possible
non-linearities. This is the object of the next section.
4.3 Rich vs. Poor
In this section I allow Granger causality coefﬁcients to differ for initially rich and poor
countries. To identify rich and poor countries I separate the original OECD from non-OECD
economies.7 I allow the coefﬁcients of the Granger-causing variable — that is Gini in the
6 I also run some regressions treating the controls as endogenous — and instrumenting them with lagged
values — without obtaining different results, so I omitted to report them for brevity.
7 Actually I selcted member countries of the OECD before May 1973, when New Zealand joined.19
inequality-to-growth regression and growth in the growth-to-inequality regression — to differ
between OECD and non-OECD economies, while I impose the coefﬁcients of the lagged
dependent variable to be the same across subgroups. I run a separate regression with and
without control variables and with the Granger-causing variable considered exogenous or
endogenous.
Results display interesting differences across subgroups. In particular, in the inequality-
to-growth regression, inequality appears to be negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with
subsequent growth only in poor countries, whereas in the sub-sample of rich countries the
opposite effect prevails. This is consistent with the credit market imperfections story cited in
the introduction. In poor countries where the constraint posed by credit market imperfections
in much more binding, more redistribution (and therefore less inequality) would be associated
with higher growth. On the other hand, in the subgroup of rich countries, where credit
constraints are less binding, the incentive effect provided by more inequality seems to prevail.
The result also remains valid controlling for other variables, both when the Gini coefﬁcient
is treated as exogenous (columns [1] and [2] in Table 10) and when it is instrumented for
(columns [3] and [4])
In the growth-to-inequality regressions, too, interesting differences between rich and
poor countries emerge. In particular, in non-OECD economies growth appears to Granger-
cause inequality with a negative coefﬁcient, while in the OECD lagged growth is positively
correlated with subsequent inequality. These differences persist even allowing for control
variables (columns [2] and [4]) and for endogeneity of lagged growth (columns [3] and [4]).8
However, it is worth noting that for OECD countries the coefﬁcient linking long-run
growth to inequality appears to be not signiﬁcantly different from zero. On the other hand, for
poor economies the long-run coefﬁcient is negative, but its magnitude is quite small: doubling
the average growth rate of the sample — that is going from 3 to 6 per cent — would imply
(taking the estimate of column [2]) a decrease in the Gini coefﬁcient of just 0.3 percentage
points and the average Gini in the sample is 33.6 per cent.
8 These estimates must be taken with caution, since the very high statistic in the Sargan test might signal
overﬁtting bias.20
5. Concluding remarks
The results of this paper can be read as a cautionary tale. The difference between
random-effect and ﬁxed-effect results in assessing the effect of lagged inequality on growth
may be due to the (arbitrary) choice of taking ﬁve or ten-year averages of Gini coefﬁcients.
Once one uses the whole annual dataset, a ﬁxed-effect (Arellano-Bond) estimator points to a
negative correlation between lagged inequality and growth. This is especially true for ‘poor’
countries, while for ‘rich’ countries the opposite relationship might hold.
With respect to the reverse correlation — much less explored in the literature — lagged
g r o w t hs e e m st ob ep o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t h subsequent inequality, but its effect seems
quantitatively negligible. Both correlations are robust to the deﬁnition of Gini and to the
exclusion of countries with either very short or very long time series on the Gini coefﬁcient.
They also survive to the introduction of (some) controls.
Once I allow for the effect to differ between rich and poor countries interesting
differences emerge. While inequality appears positively correlated with growth in the
subgroup of rich countries, in poor countries, besides a negative and signiﬁcant effect of
lagged inequality on growth, there is a negative and signiﬁcant effect of lagged growth on
inequality. Stretching these results somewhat, it can be said that they provide some support for
the view that in poor countries the feedback between these variable can create a virtuous cycle.
Redistributive polices, possibly targeted at easing credit constraints, would lower inequality
and enhance growth; in turn, higher growth would further reduce inequality.Appendix
Data sources
Inequality: GINI adjusted as in Table 1; Dollar and Kraay(2002).
Growth: RGDPCH (percentage change) ; Heston et al. (2002)
Openness: OPENK adjusted (see main text); Heston et al. (2002)
Price of investment:P I ;H e s t o net al. (2002)
Inﬂation: log(1 + consumer price inﬂation); International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Public expenditure: KG; Heston et al. (2002)Tables                                                                         Table 1







East Asia & Paciﬁc .0370***
(.0059)
E. Europe & Central Asia -.0456***
(.0077)
Middle East & North Africa .1007***
(.0120)








Notes: estimation by OLS. Standard error in brackets. A whole set of year dummy
variables includedTable 2
Inequality and growth: summary statistics
growth Gini
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
all countries .028 .042 .321 .074
OECD .024 .029 .303 .037
others .031 .055 .336 .101Table 3
Inequality and growth: contemporaneous correlations
pairwise rank
growth inequality growth inequality




Country average .0824 .1343 .1244 .2496
[0.613] [0.472] [0.444] [0.176]
o b s 4 03 14 03 1
Notes: P-values in square brackets below coefﬁcients.Table 4
Growth equation: basic speciﬁcation
dep. var. growth FE GMM 1 GMM 2
lagged Gini (sum) .0317 -.0394 -.1018
[0.711] [0.769] [ 0.513]
long-run Gini .0356 -.0407** -.0986***
{0.342} {0.020} {0.000}
obs 290 290 290





Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Fixed Effects estimator in column FE and Arellano-Bond estimator in columns GMM 1 and
GMM 2, one-step results with robust standard errors. In square brackets below coefﬁcients,
p-values of the test that the sum of lagged Gini coefﬁcients is zero; in curly brackets below
coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that all lagged Gini coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. R2
is the within-R2 in column ‘FE’. In the column ‘GMM 1’, the maximum number of lags of the
dependent variable used as instruments is 5. In the column ‘GMM 2’, the maximum number of
lags of the dependent and the explanatory variables used as instruments is 2. The Sargan test
comes from the one-step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order autocorrelation
in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 5
Inequality equation: basic speciﬁcation
dep. var. Gini FE GMM 1 GMM 2
lagged growth (sum) .1340** .0084 .0120
[0.034] [0.897] [0.855]
long-run growth .5254** .0101** .0158***
{0.016} {0.012} {0.009}
obs 241 241 241





Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Fixed Effects estimator in column FE and Arellano-Bond estimator in columns GMM 1 and
GMM 2, one-step results with robust standard errors. In square brackets below coefﬁcients,
p-values of the test that the sum of lagged growth coefﬁcients is zero; in curly brackets below
coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that all lagged growth coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. R2
is the within-R2 in column ‘FE’. In the column ‘GMM 1’, the maximum number of lags of the
dependent variable used as instruments is 5. In the column ‘GMM 2’, the maximum number
of lags of the dependent variables used as instruments is 1 and of the explanatory variables is
2. The Sargan test comes from the one-step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order
autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 6
Growth equation: sensitivity analysis
dep var. growth inc net inc obs>1 exUSA exGBR exTWN exIND
lagged Gini (sum) -.1024 -.6603** -.0736 -.1127 -.0631 -.0284 -.1008
[0.537] [0.042] [0.584] [0.4063] [0.619] [0.830] [0.459]
long-run Gini -.1308* -.5827** -.0774** -.1177** -.0642*** -.0289** -.1092*
{0.052} {0.044} {0.011} {0.021} {0.008} {0.026} {0.077}
obs 211 117 282 250 261 266 266
countries 25 17 32 39 39 39 39
Sargan(p-val) 0.9492 0.9974 0.4720 0.8924 0.7343 0.5704 0.8165
LM1(p-val) 0.0052 0.0709 0.0026 0.0059 0.0046 0.0050 0.0042
LM2(p-val) 0.3353 0.7223 0.9944 0.8727 0.8788 0.9705 0.9728
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by Arellano-Bond estimator, one-
step results with robust standard errors. In square brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that the sum of lagged
Gini coefﬁcients is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that all lagged Gini coefﬁcients are
simultaneously zero. In the column ‘net inc’, the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 2;
in the column ‘inc’, the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 3; in all the other columns,
the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 5. The Sargan test comes from the one-step
homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test fork-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 7
Inequality equation: sensitivity analysis
dep. var. Gini inc net inc obs>1 exUSA exGBR exTWN exIND
lagged growth (sum) .0245 .0338 .0620 .0371 .0250 .0183 .0100
[0.757] [0.826] [0.255] [0.590] [0.742] [0.805] [0.901]
long-run growth .0269** .0701** .0817** .0338** .0247*** .0190*** .0101**
{0.026} {0.043} {0.025} {0.042} {0.006} {0.006} {0.039}
obs 210 117 233 202 213 218 219
c o u n t r i e s 2 41 72 33 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Sargan(p-val) 0.9848 0.9456 0.9895 0.3619 0.8300 0.7408 0.6597
LM1(p-val) 0.0074 0.0054 0.0060 0.0098 0.0040 0.0030 0.0092
LM2(p-val) 0.0711 0.0810 0.1345 0.0499 0.0519 0.0539 0.1085
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by Arellano-Bond estimator, one-
step results with robust standard errors. In square brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that the sum of lagged
growth coefﬁcients is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that all lagged growth coefﬁcients are
simultaneously zero. In the column ‘exUSA’, the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 2;
in the column ‘inc’, the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 4; in the column ‘obs>1’,
the maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 5; in all the other columns, the maximum
number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 3. The Sargan test comes from the one-step homoskedastic
estimator. LMk is a test fork-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 8
Growth equation: controls
dep. var. growth [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
lagged Gini (sum) -.0501 -.0347 -.0538 -.0566 -.0582
[0.718] [0.790] [0.704] [ 0.684] [ 0.682]
adj. openness(×100) .1026** -.0048
[0.041] [0.942]




public expenditure(×100) .0793 .0071
[0.521] [0.959]
long-run Gini -.0519** -.0358** -.0485*** -.0586** -.0449***
{0.029} {0.026} {0.006} {0.018} {0.004}
obs 290 290 278 290 278
countries 40 40 40 40 40
Sargan(p-val) 0.4168 0.4102 0.0633 0.4337 0.0682
LM1(p-val) 0.0023 0.0031 0.0068 0.0027 0.0059
LM2(p-val) 0.9424 0.9201 0.0656 0.9639 0.0637
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Arellano-Bond estimator, one-step results with robust standard errors. All controls are dated t.
In square brackets below the coefﬁcient of lagged Gini (sum), p-values of the test that the sum
of the lagged Gini coefﬁcients is zero, below the other coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that it
is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients of long-run Gini, p-values of the test that all
the lagged Gini coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. In columns [3] and [5], the maximum
number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 4; in all the other columns, the
maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 5. The Sargan test
comes from the one-step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order autocorrelation
in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 9
Inequality equation: controls
dep. var. Gini [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
lagged growth .0098 .0084 .0084 .0095 .0103
[0.877] [0.899] [0.910] [0.886] [0.895]
adj. openness(×100) -.0042 .0015
[0.795] [0.960]




public expenditure(×100) .1342 .1534
[0.271] [0.221]
long-run growth .0118** .0100** .0111** .0117** .0131**
{0.019} {0.018} {0.024} {0.012} {0.039}
obs 241 241 229 241 229
countries 31 31 31 31 31
Sargan(p-val) 0.9873 0.9810 0.9948 0.9891 0.9910
LM1(p-val) 0.0023 0.0029 0.0018 0.0023 0.0026
LM2(p-val) 0.0584 0.0601 0.0940 0.0610 0.1167
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Arellano-Bond estimator, one-step results with robust standard errors. All controls are dated
t. In square brackets below the coefﬁcient of lagged growth (sum), p-values of the test that
the sum of the lagged growth coefﬁcients is zero, below the other coefﬁcients, p-values of the
test that it is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients of long-run growth, p-values of the
test that all the lagged growth coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. In all the columns, the
maximum number of lags of the dependent variable used as instruments is 5. The Sargan test
comes from the one-step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order autocorrelation
in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.Table 10
Growth equation: rich vs. poor
dep. var. growth [1] [2] [3] [4]
lagged Gini(sum){oecd} .3710** .4746*** .5937** .5129***
[0.040] [0.007] [0.014] [0.008]
lagged Gini(sum){other} -.3867** -.2128 -.2290 -.0730
[0.024] [0.185] [0.131] [0.680]




price of investment(×100) .0041 0.0009
[0.873] [0.964]
public expenditure(×100) .0164 -.0051
[0.912] [0.967]
long-run Gini {oecd} .3675** .4678*** .5742*** .4361***
{0.010} {0.003} {0.008} {0.002}
long-run Gini {other} -.3697*** -.1909*** -.2312*** -.0963***
{0.000} {0.001} {0.000} {0.002}
obs 290 278 290 278
countries 40 40 40 40
Sargan(p-val) 0.1012 0.0720 0.9997 0.9924
LM1(p-val) 0.0146 0.0056 0.0044 0.0056
LM2(p-val) 0.9904 0.0947 0.9883 0.1428
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Arellano-Bond estimator in all columns, one-step results with robust standard errors. All
controls are dated t. In square brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that the
sum of the lagged Gini coefﬁcients is zero; below the other coefﬁcients, p-values of the test
that it is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients of long-run Gini, p-values of the test
that all the lagged Gini coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. In columns [1] and [2], only the
laggeddependent variableisinstrumented; maximum numberoflags ofthedependent variable
used as instruments is 4. In columns [3] and [4] both lagged dependent and Granger-causing
variables are instrumented; the maximum number of lags of the dependent and the explanatory
variables used as instruments is, respectively, 2 and 1. The Sargan test comes from the one-
step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-differenced
residuals.Table 11
Inequality equation: rich vs. poor
dep var. Gini [1] [2] [3] [4]
lagged growth(sum) {oecd} .0097 .0679 .0308 .0732
[0.926] [0.594] [0.745] [0.528]
lagged growth(sum) {other} -.0039 -.0014 -.0075 -.0060
[0.955] [0.985] [0.919] [0.939]




price of investment(×100) .1689 .0084
[0.193] [0.463]
public expenditure(×100) .1690 .2205**
[0.032] [0.028]
long-run growth {oecd} .0136 .1010 .0693 .1335
{0.410} {0.594} [0.371] {0.459}
long-run growth {other} -.0055** -.0021** -.0169*** -.0109**
{0.015} {0.048} {0.009} {0.015}
obs 241 229 241 229
countries 31 31 31 31
Sargan(p-val) 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
LM1(p-val) 0.0019 0.0027 0.0024 0.0034
LM2(p-val) 0.0540 0.1356 0.0590 0.1291
Notes: All regressions include a whole set of year dummy variables. Estimation by
Arellano-Bond estimator in all columns, one-step results with robust standard errors. All
controls are dated t. In square brackets below the coefﬁcients, p-values of the test that the
sum of the lagged growth coefﬁcients is zero; below the other coefﬁcients, p-values of the
test that it is zero; in curly brackets below the coefﬁcients of long-run growth, p-values of
the test that all the lagged growth coefﬁcients are simultaneously zero. In columns [1] and
[2], only the lagged dependent variable is instrumented; the maximum number of lags of the
dependent variable used as instruments is 6. In columns [3] and [4] both lagged dependent and
Granger-causing variables are instrumented; the maximum number of lags of the dependent
and the explanatory variables used as instruments is 2. The Sargan test comes from the one-
step homoskedastic estimator. LMk is a test for k-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-differenced
residuals.Table 12
Data
code Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
ARM 2 0.69 1 0.41
AUS 1 0.34 - -
BGR 4 1.38 3 1.24
BLR 2 0.69 1 0.41
BRA 9 3.1 6 2.49
CAN 10 3.45 8 3.32
CHN 15 5.17 14 5.81
CIV 2 0.69 1 0.41
COL 1 0.34 - -
CZE 5 1.72 4 1.66
DNK 5 1.72 3 1.24
ESP 3 1.03 2 0.83
EST 4 1.38 3 1.24
FIN 6 2.07 5 2.07
G B R 2 91 02 8 1 1 . 6 2
GHA 2 0.69 - -
HND 4 1.38 3 1.24
HUN 3 1.03 2 0.83
IND 24 8.28 22 9.13
IRN 2 0.69 1 0.41
ITA 9 3.1 8 3.32
JAM 4 1.38 3 1.24
JPN 16 5.52 14 5.81
KOR 2 0.69 1 0.41
LKA 1 0.34 - -
NGA 1 0.34 - -
NLD 4 1.38 2 0.83
NOR 6 2.07 5 2.07
NZL 1 0.34 - -
PAK 3 1.03 1 0.41
PAN 1 0.34 - -
POL 16 5.52 15 6.22
PRT 1 0.34 - -
RUS 2 0.69 1 0.41
SVK 8 2.76 7 2.9
SVN 1 0.34 - -
SWE 15 5.17 14 5.81
TWN 24 8.28 23 9.54
USA 40 13.79 39 16.18
VEN 2 0.69 1 0.41
Total 290 100 241 100References
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